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Abstract
This article deals with the influence of transaction costs and organizational competences on the choice of governance 
structure for manufacturing stage in a productive system. The objective is to develop a conceptual model that explains 
the choice of supplier for manufacturing through transaction costs and organizational competences. Following earlier 
studies, the model proposes competences of the product´s owner influence the vertical scope in a relation moderated 
by transaction costs. The constructs in the model are: “governance structure”, the dependent variable categorized as 
internal or external supplier, “transaction costs”, measured by asset specificity of the product and bargain power of the 
firm in the manufacturing stage, and “competences on operations”, measured by experience and diversification of the 
firm. The study presents some methodological implications for applying the model in Brazilian pharmaceutical industry, 
through searching for secondary data on drugs and firms in a public database of the federal regulatory agency.
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Introduction
This article deals with the influence of transaction 
costs and organizational competences on the adoption 
of governance structures for manufacturing stage 
in a productive system. The study follows a series 
of investigations that seek to establish relationships 
between the approaches of organizational economics and 
organizational competences (Williamson, 1999; Hoetker, 
2005; Nakamura & Odagiri, 2005). Governance structures 
are related to firm boundaries in the value chain, which 
separate transactions coordinated by internal hierarchy 
from those involving external partners, through contracts 
or open market conditions. 
In organizational economics, the study of transactions 
and governance structures to coordinate them has its 
origins with Coase (1937), who presented the question 
on the reasons for the existence of the firm. The central 
argument of this seminal article is that the rising of cost 
incurred to conducting transactions in markets favors the 
incorporation of these transactions as internal activities 
of firms. Since the decade of 1970, these ideas have been 
taken up in several studies of Oliver Williamson, laying 
the foundation of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).
Transactions are transfers of goods and services between 
technologically distinct productive stages (Williamson, 
1999). Thus they can occur within firm or crossing its 
borders and involving external agents. The construct is 
the basic unit of analysis in TCE, which is described with 
dimensions of frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity. 
This last is prevalent in empirical studies and indicates the 
potential for loss of investments incurred in a transaction, 
if that does not take place. In this approach, the governance 
structure adopted is the result of a rational choice to 
minimize transaction costs, mainly due to the hazard of 
opportunistic behavior by the counterpart in a transaction.
The approaches of organizational competences have 
sought to understand the processes of adaptation and 
change in organizations as ways of adjusting to changing 
environments (Bataglia & Meirelles, 2009, Teece, Pisano 
& Shuen, 1997, Dosi et al., 2000). The concept of routines 
has been considered in developing such approaches for 
representing the expression of organizational capabilities 
during the performance of business processes at any 
stage of the value chain. For Becker (2004) routines are 
recurrent patterns of interactions between agents. The 
author highlights the routine´s role of preservation of 
organizational knowledge, by offering solutions to the 
problems built up over time.
The pharmaceutical industry in Brazil is undergoing 
significant changes in the last decade, especially since the 
creation of generic drugs regulatory category, by Law no. 
9.787/99 in 1999. Until the late 1990s, the market consisted 
of two categories “innovative drugs” produced largely by 
global industry leaders and launched under its own brand and 
“similar drugs”, copies with the same active ingredients and 
pharmaceutical formulations of innovative products, usually 
released by mid-sized and small companies, predominantly 
with domestic capital. The advent of generics, which are 
obtained from formulas whose patents expired, created 
an alternative with products that have equivalence with 
the reference product and are certified by laboratories 
accredited by the federal drug regulation agency, entitled 
National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA - Agência 
Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária) (Quental et.al. 2008).
The proposed research problem in this study is: what 
is the influence of transaction costs and organizational 
competencies in the make-or-buy decision for 
manufacturing stage? The general objective of the study 
is to develop a conceptual model that explains the choice 
of supplier for manufacturing through transaction costs 
and organizational competences. The specific objectives 
are: (1) assess the current literature on the approaches 
of transaction cost economics of organizational and 
organizational competences on the subject, (2) define 
measurable variables and develop hypotheses for the 
constructs involved, and (3) analyze the feasibility of 
applying the model to pharmaceutical industry in Brazil.
The study has two justifications. The first is to deepen 
knowledge about the relationships between the approaches 
of organizational economics and organizational competences. 
Organizational economics could be improved with the 
analysis of issues internal to the organization affected by 
the transactions, such as routines and competences. In the 
other way, may be useful for organizational competences 
approach aggregation of aspects related to the transactions 
and governance structures. It is assumed that a point of 
contact between the approaches may be the choice of 
governance structure, to be explained by transaction costs 
and organizational competences.
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The second justification is to offer methodological tools 
for empirical studies on the management of transaction 
costs and capabilities in the Brazilian pharmaceutical 
industry. Understanding the determinants of adoption 
of governance structures in the value chain can help 
guide public policies in the areas of financial support and 
innovation. Private agents could benefit from knowing 
the firm boundaries of competitors in manufacturing 
stage. The study evaluates the possibility of applying the 
conceptual model for the manufacturing step in a globally 
dynamic industry such as pharmaceuticals, which is 
changing in Brazil with the growth of national laboratories 
(Ferreira, 2010).
The study is structured in eight parts, including this 
introduction. The second section presents the main 
concepts of Transaction Cost Economics, followed by 
a brief discussion of the organizational competences 
approach in the third and the relations between the 
theories in the fourth. An overview of the pharmaceutical 
industry is the subject in the fifth section, the conceptual 
model with variables and hypotheses are presented in 
the sixth section, and in the seventh there are some 
methodological implications applying the model. The last 
section presents the final considerations.
Transaction Costs Economics
The main conceptual movement of TCE is to describe 
firms not in terms of neoclassical economics (production 
function), but with an organizational approach (governance 
structures). The argument is that in a world of positive 
transaction costs, exchange agreements need to be 
governed and that, depending on the transaction, some 
forms of governance are better than others. An example 
is the acquisition of an input in a production chain 
from an external agent or the incorporation of input 
manufacturing within the firm. This is the choice between 
vertical integration and external supply of a particular 
stage of production. The external supply can be done in 
market conditions or long-term contracts. If the activity 
is internalized, the governance structure would be the 
hierarchy (Ruester, 2010).
A useful concept in the construction of the theory was 
incomplete contracts, initially proposed by Simon (1951) 
to examine the possibility of settling labor contracts in 
the market or within the firm. Williamson (1975) takes 
this concept to analyze the vertical integration. TCE 
has the premise that all contracts are incomplete, due 
to the uncertainty of events in the environment or the 
inability of agents to process information related to 
the transaction and anticipate all possible outcomes 
of a contractual relationship. The limitation of human 
information processing is known as bounded rationality 
and became one of the behavioral assumptions of TCE.
An economic implication for the incompleteness of contracts 
is that parties are vulnerable to calculated efforts by others 
to deceive, avoiding compliance, cheating or another way 
to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the transaction 
partners. To protect against such opportunistic behavior, 
parties select institutional arrangements to minimize 
the total cost to consummate the transactions involved. 
Williamson (1979) develops the asset specificity concept and 
shows the relationship of this attribute of the transaction 
with the choice of governance structures. He argues that 
opportunism is relevant to raise the transaction costs in 
situations where there are specific assets and contracts are 
incomplete. He also proposes a comparative institutional 
assessment of transaction costs, since each governance 
structure is associated with certain transaction costs.
The role of asset specificity in the choice of governance 
structures is discussed in Williamson (1985). He proposes 
that the relevant attributes of the transaction to the choice 
of governance structure are frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity. Correlations are established between 
certain attributes and governance structures. The theory 
predicts that the higher the asset specificity and higher the 
level of uncertainty, the greater the need for subsequent 
adjustments to investments in specific assets. Thus, it is 
expected the predominance of hierarchical relationship, 
in which one party has control over both sides of a 
transaction, since this structure can provide greater ease 
for the resolution of disputes with the use of authority.
With regard to identification of the governance structures, 
TCE proposes that they form a continuum so that one end 
would be spot market and the other would be vertical 
integration. Between these extremes there would be a 
myriad of contractual forms called hybrid, which can be 
associated with long-term contracts. Klein et al. (1978) 
consider that the long-term contracts may represent 
possible solutions to the threat of hold-up. One of the 
propositions of the article is that the smaller the quasi-
rent that may be appropriated during the renegotiation 
process, the greater the chance that the transactions are 
carried out under market conditions.
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Despite the existence of some criticism, the approach of 
TCE has stimulated a large volume of empirical studies 
on the choice of governance structures, considering 
the effects of transaction attributes on these choices. 
As Joskow (2005), most empirical studies of TCE have 
focused on the problem of vertical integration and the 
development of non-standard contractual arrangements 
over time. He argues that TCE has been promoting a 
synergy between theory, empirical analysis and public 
policy in the last twenty-five years, and that the empirical 
results have been consistent with the theory.
Some empirical studies can be presented as examples 
of this methodological approach, such as Monteverde 
& Teece (1982), the first econometric study that tested 
the hypotheses of TCE for the choice of vertical 
integration. The study examined the decision between 
buying and manufacturing 133 automotive components 
used by GM and Ford in 1976, testing the hypothesis 
that these companies would adopt vertical integration if 
the production process could create a very specialized 
or specific knowledge. Using as proxy for specificity the 
amount of engineering effort to develop the product, the 
results supported the hypothesis generated in accordance 
with the theory. The work provided evidence for the 
importance of human capital specificity in the decision to 
integrate vertically backward.
Organizational Competences
According to Dosi and Teece (1993), the firm is based on 
specific competences to coordinate activities and learn 
about new activities in complex and changing environments. 
These competences are the pillars of competitiveness 
of the firm and involve a coordinated set of capabilities, 
complementary assets and organizational routines. Routines 
are patterns of interactions that represent a solution to 
particular problems. They bring together complementary 
assets and skills of individuals. Therefore, in routine 
resides the knowledge generated by learning activities. In 
other words, the learning processes are concerned to the 
development of changes in routines and competences of 
firms (Bataglia, Silva, & Klement, 2011).
The construct of organizational knowledge has been 
treated by Dosi, Nelson & Winter (2000) to identify 
ways in which it is acquired, maintained, increased and 
sometimes lost. The focus of their analysis involves forms 
of knowledge that affect the organization’s ability to 
conduct its main productive activities, such as the provision 
or development of tangible products or services. The 
authors present a discussion on organizational capabilities 
as the know-how that enables organizations to conduct 
these activities. This knowledge, resulting from the 
resolution of problems and response to external stimuli 
is translated and stored in organizational routines, which 
are distinguished from skills, since these are individual and 
those are collective.
The organizational learning that underlies the evolution of 
the firm can be described by two key dimensions (Bataglia 
& Meirelles, 2009). The first is selective environment, 
characterized by the demands of the competition. 
The second is the adaptation of firms, focusing on 
strategic decision making (Bataglia & Yu, 2008), which is 
responsible for generation and selection of alternative 
changes (variations) in the routines and organizational 
capabilities towards a better alignment to the selective 
environmental system. Thus, firms seek to increase their 
ability to survive and efficiency in achieving its goals.
Most economic models analyze firms as independent 
entities, an approach considered appropriate in most 
cases by Hesterly & Barney (1996). However, in recent 
years has been recognized the importance of sets of firms 
that cooperate with each other as important players in 
the competitive landscape.
The formal strategic partnerships, which are based 
on contracts, were analyzed by Powell et al. (1996). 
An important incentive to engage in strategic alliances 
is to explore the sources of complementary assets 
(Kogut, 1988). Assets controlled by two or more firms 
are considered complementary when their combined 
economic values are larger than their value in each firm 
separately. Some of the main motivations for alliances 
are presented by Barney and Hesterly (1996, p.167): 
economies of scale, cost-effective entry into new markets 
or segments; learn with competitors, manage strategic 
uncertainty, manage costs and share risks, and facilitate 
tacit cartelization.
Other factors that can be combined to justify the 
cooperative processes are access to new technology, 
speed to market and complementary capabilities (Kogut, 
1988; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Momigliano & 
Balcet (1983) also point to other factors to encourage 
international cooperation agreements: (a) technology 
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features, (b) diversity of nature and economic destination 
for international operations, (c) impact of new technologies 
on the scale economy of the companies, (d) structural 
characteristics of the industry, and (e) characteristics of 
the countries of origin of companies.
Relations between TCE and Competence 
Approaches
In this section we discuss the possibilities and the 
outcomes of the combination of TCE and organizational 
competences approaches to study the limits of the firm. A 
pioneering attempt to combine economic and behavioral 
constructs in the development of the theory of the firm 
was made by Cyert and March (1963). 
Reve (1990) notes the area of strategic management, with 
significant growth in business schools, has not advanced 
in developing a theory of the firm. Using concepts from 
transaction costs theory, agency theory and dynamic 
capabilities approach, he elaborates a conceptual model 
to establish the basis for a future contractual theory of the 
firm. He proposes to expand the concept of the firm as a 
set of internal and external contracts. Thus, the firm could 
be defined as a set of core capabilities and organizational 
incentives (which form the strategic core), complementary 
capabilities and inter-organizational incentives (which form 
strategic alliances). For the author this model would cope 
with the view of strategy of Rumelt (1982) as a powerful 
set of unique resources and relationships.
The boundaries of the firm in research and development 
(R&D) stage in manufacturing firms were analyzed by 
Nakamura & Odagiri (2004). Through a study of data on 
14,000 companies in Japan, they evaluate the adoption 
of R&D with independent activities, commissioning 
contracts, joint action and licensing. The model estimates 
at a first stage if the company performs R&D and second, 
if so, the volume of spending on access to external R&D 
resources. To explain these behaviors independent 
variables related to the theories of transaction costs 
and competences are included. The results seem to 
support both approaches. Evidence indicates the need of 
competences related to the size of the firm, intensity of 
internal R&D, diversification and vertical integration to 
be able to use external sources of R&D. The study also 
reveals that the patent appropriability reduces transaction 
costs for these contractual arrangements.
The choice of supplier for an innovative item in the 
computer industry is analyzed by Hoetker (2005), through 
the development and testing of a conceptual model. Based 
on concepts of TCE, organizational competences and 
networks of firms approaches, he establishes hypotheses 
to explain the choice between internal and external 
suppliers, based on aspects of competences (number 
of patents), technological uncertainty, and relationship 
history. The results of the empirical test supported the 
hypotheses proposed and presented evidence that the 
proposed model has greater explanatory power than 
theories applied separately. The results indicate that in 
situations of low uncertainty, external suppliers are the 
most recommended because of specialization and reduction 
of production costs. If the uncertainty is the median, can 
still be used suppliers, but the weight of past relationship 
increases. In the case of extreme uncertainty, the model 
indicates a tendency to use internal suppliers. 
In a qualitative case study, Di Serio et al (2011) analyzed the 
outsourcing process adopted by Phillips for producing LCD 
televisions make or buy decision.  The executives pointed 
out that the LCD panel is an important resource and that 
its supply by third parties represented a high transaction 
cost. Some disadvantages of outsourcing can be found in the 
model adopted by Philips: the probable loss of capabilities 
that are important for operating in the LCD television 
segment and the difficulty in creating and managing legal 
contracts. The authors sought to explore the supposed 
theoretical complementarity between Resource Based 
Theory (RBT) and the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT). The 
TCT approach is based on an economic bias and suggests 
short and medium term analyses of outsourcing processes, 
while the RBT approach, because it has a strategic bias, ends 
up suggesting longer term analyses, since it is concerned 
with future competitive positioning.
Another effort of integration between the approaches 
of transaction costs and competences is presented by 
Jacobides & Winter (2005). In a theoretical study, the 
authors elaborate a conceptual model for co-evolution 
of transaction costs and competences along a productive 
chain. In this construction, the initial assumption is that the 
distribution of competencies between the actors determines 
the vertical scope that they adopt in the value chain, and this 
relationship would be moderated by transaction costs. If 
distribution of skills is uneven, it is expected the occurrence 
of agent specialization and transactions between them, even 
if transaction costs are high. On the other hand, if the 
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competences are uniform across agents, the specialization 
of agents would only occur if transaction costs are low.
The decision to make or buy engines by the automakers 
in the United States at the beginning of the industry is 
analyzed by Bigelow and Argyres (2008). In a quantitative 
study of secondary data with the total population of 
firms, the authors use independent variables related to 
transaction costs and business experience to explain the 
boundaries of the firm in the step of engines supply in 
vehicles production. The results indicate that firms tend 
to produce more engines with unique characteristics and 
to acquire standard engines from independent suppliers, 
which confirms the hypothesis that asset specificity favors 
the vertical integration. The same results were found 
for mechanical subsystems that require more complex 
interfaces. Regarding the effect of evolution, the results 
indicate that industry experience favors the vertical 
integration of supply of engines. They consider the 
latter result is related to the tendency of firms seek to 
increase the capture of return through higher production 
competences over time in the industry.
The literature seems to indicate a considerable amount 
of evidence that transaction costs and organizational 
competences operate in a complementary way as 
determinants of governance structures (Jacobides & 
Winter, 2005).
Pharmaceutical Sector Overview
During the past 25 years, the pharmaceutical industry is 
undergoing profound changes in the following aspects: 
(1) technology, with the development of biotechnology 
and molecular biology revolution, (2) demand, affected 
by cost containment policies by the major consumers 
(private and public health systems) and (3) institutions, 
especially the law of property rights (McKelvy et al. 2004; 
Malerba, 2004).
Until the decade of 1970, the chemical technology was 
predominant and the research was developed internally 
by companies. The introduction of new chemicals into 
the main developed markets was adequately protected 
by a patent law, guaranteeing protection against imitation. 
Besides the R&D, companies in the industry have 
developed expertise in managing large-scale clinical trials, 
in the process of obtaining approval of the medicines in 
regulatory agencies, as well as marketing and distribution. 
At this time, as McKelvy et al. (2004), especially in the 
United States, relations between industry and universities 
have become narrower, due to increased public spending 
on biomedical research and to increase in the rigor for 
the approval of new drugs.
From the 80´s, a phase of profound change begins in 
the pharmaceutical industry, from the emergence of 
a new technological paradigm with molecular biology 
and genetic engineering (direct manipulation of genetic 
material). These new technologies bring new actors into 
the innovation system in the industry: new dedicated 
biotechnology companies (NBC), constituents of the new 
segment of biotechnology. These companies were primarily 
the product of the universities, and were usually formed 
through collaboration between scientists and marketers, 
supported primarily by venture capital. The function of 
NBCs was to mobilize the fundamental knowledge created 
in universities and turn it into marketable products and 
technical potential. The business model becomes based on 
the idea of the firm (NBC) possessing valuable intangible 
capital in knowledge on products or processes, which 
is protected by an adequate intellectual property rights 
system. This kind of firm becomes attractive to investment 
capital - venture capital, not only to fund the projects, but 
also to bring management competences necessary for the 
connection between science and markets.
The integration of NBCs with large pharmaceutical 
companies proved to be the ideal way for their survival. 
They came to stand in a cooperative attitude, as providers 
of research services to large corporations, which must 
continually acquire and develop new knowledge. On 
the other hand, NBEs got financial resources needed 
to finance R&D, and structure to development, testing, 
production and marketing of products (Coriat et al. 2004; 
McKelvy et al., 2004). 
The complementarities between biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies were mentioned by Hernández-
Cuevas (2007), when he analyzed the future of drug 
discovery process in bio pharmaceutical corporations. 
Biotechnology firms are mainly concerned with the 
generation of new drugs using breakthrough technologies, 
while pharmaceutical corporations are usually cash-
abundant and can buy innovation from Biotechs. Then, 
Bio Pharma can effectively take those novel drugs and 
navigate them through the regulatory affairs conundrum 
and subsequently bring them onto the global market place 
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successfully. The author argue it is vital that Biotechnology 
and Pharmaceutical companies come up with appropriately 
balanced deals where the contributions, rewards and 
strengths of each collaborating party are clearly recognized. 
This is especially relevant as biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies are turning with increasing frequency to in-
licensing and collaboration agreements.
While the state of the art in the global pharmaceutical 
industry the collaborative innovation on biotechnology, in 
emerging countries the technological status of domestic 
firms is situated some steps behind. This is the case of China, 
which is treated by Ding et al (2011), with a description of 
how the historical, legal, and institutional contexts in which 
China’s drug R&D has evolved. According to the authors, 
China’s drug R&D evolution can be viewed to have four 
phases: (1) pure imitation (1949 – 1985), (2) innovative 
imitation (1984 – 1993), (3) imitative innovation (1992 – 
2008), and (4) independent innovation (2008 – ). In Phase I, 
pure imitation, the pharmaceutical firms fully depended on 
copying synthetic methods and preparation technologies 
of drugs from foreign companies. In Phase II, innovative 
imitation, China’s drug innovation was mainly based on 
modifying delivery methods and preparation formulations 
of existing drugs without changing the drug molecular 
structure. In Phase III, imitative innovation, drug innovation 
was focused on chemical modifications of the structure 
of existing drugs, such as changing acid or basic group, 
altering optical configuration, and developing isomers of 
original drugs to develop “me-too” drugs. Finally, in Phase 
IV, independent innovation, Chinese companies will be able 
to discover new chemical entities (NCEs) using advanced 
innovation technologies (Ding et al, 2011).
The value chain in the pharmaceutical industry is 
composed by the following four stages: (1) research and 
development (R&D), (2) active principle production, (3) 
pharmaceutical specialty production (drugs), (4) marketing 
and commercialization of pharmaceutical specialty. In this 
global context, international companies incorporate each 
stage activities according to the technical development 
level of the country where they are established (Silva & 
Oliveira, 2007). 
In Brazil, the history of the industry until the late 90’s 
is characterized by the dominance of large multinational 
drug makers, that were attracted by the potential of the 
Brazilian market and established the stages of production 
and marketing of their products. The phases of R&D and 
production of raw materials essential to the manufacture 
of drugs, with higher technological content were, mostly, 
kept in their home countries. As Bastos (2006), historically 
the participation of foreign companies in the sector was 
about 70% of total sales in the Brazilian market.
Regarding the production chain, in 1974 the pharmaceutical 
industry had 529 companies, of which 460 domestic and 
69 foreign, 50% of the active ingredients of the drugs were 
imported and 90% of drugs released in the market stemmed 
from research done abroad. At that time, the low relevance 
of R&D in Brazilian companies was influenced by the lack 
of financial resources and an articulated innovation system 
needed to fund and encourage the development of R&D 
projects, which are of long maturity (Capanema, 2006). 
A relevant initiative by the Brazilian government in the 
90´ to promote the pharmaceutical sector and others 
was PITCE - Política Industrial, Tecnológica e Comércio 
Exterior (Foreign Trade, Industry and Technology 
Policy Directives). Silva & Oliveira, (2007) conducted 
an comparative analysis of the sector between 1993 and 
2003, and found few improvements in reducing the active 
principle and drug foreign dependence or promoting 
domestic production and demand in order to the country 
be promoted to the position of a great player in the active 
principle and drug world market. However, the authors 
argue that the PITCE measures comprise a complete 
answer inserted in what we here conventionally call 
“modern industrial policy”. 
The main vertical measures in this program for 
pharmaceutical industry are: export fomenting, including 
improving the export schedule and replacing imports 
competitively, development and ntegration of domestic 
industrial complexes, credit support for restructuring and 
fomenting technological upgrade, subventions and direct 
and indirect fiscal-financial assistance through reducing 
tax burden, performance and counterpart requirements 
for sectors assisted by governmental benefits, temporary 
and selective tariff protection for specific sectors to 
be developed, foreign risky investment performance 
requirements and State purchase use and direct intervention 
in the restructuring the sector (Silva & Oliveira, 2007). 
The pharmaceutical industry in Brazil and particularly 
the national groups, received greater incentive to invest 
in production from the Generic Drug Law (Law 9787), 
passed in 1999, which allows the replacement of drugs 
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with a similar after the expiration of the patent with 
guaranteed quality by regulatory authorities.
In 2005, Brazil was in 10th position in the global 
pharmaceutical market, with revenues of USD 22.2 billion, 
equivalent to sales of 1.61 billion units (Capanema, 2006). 
Despite the increase in real sales in 2005 over the previous 
year of 11%, there was a slight decrease in the number 
of units sold, about 2.3%. The Brazilian pharmaceutical 
market, from the perspective of supply, has changed 
significantly in recent years. National companies, which 
in 2000 accounted for about 28.2% of the value of drug 
sales, in March 2005 had increased its stake to 40.6%.
According to Capanema (2006) in 2002 were identified 
1,077 companies operating in the industry, 688 of which 
employ fewer than 20 employees, a number that can be 
considered insufficient to characterize a pharmaceutical 
industry. Thus, it is estimated that there are about 500 
laboratories operating in Brazil. As Caliari & Ruiz (2010), 
in 2007 four of the ten largest companies had national 
capital and represented 21.7% of the market. They are: 
EMS (7.1% in the first position), Aché (5.6% in the third 
position), Medley (5.5% in the fourth position) and 
Eurofarma (3.5%, in sixth place), the authors also point 
out that Brazilian companies account for about 88% of 
the generics market. Thus, policy implementation for 
generics has resulted in increased scale of production by 
domestic firms. 
Conceptual Model
This section presents a conceptual model for explanation 
of governance structures in the manufacturing stage based 
on transaction cost and organizational competences 
approaches. The basic justification for the model is 
presented by Williamson (1999), noting the possibility 
of combining the approaches of transaction costs and 
organizational competences to explain the choice of 
governance structures. This author speculate whether 
the attributes of the transaction could explain the 
choice of generic governance structure, while aspects of 
organizational learning could influence some attributes 
of the chosen governance structure, which could be 
investigated with the analysis of routines.
Two delimitations were chosen in the model design: the 
first for the construct “governance structure” and the 
second concerning the transactions to be analyzed. The 
theme of governance structures involves an extensive field 
research, specifically for hybrid structures. In this subject, 
the attributes of coordinated adaptation, autonomous 
adaptation, incentives and administrative costs, identified 
by Menard (2002), can be analyzed in greater depth to allow 
more detailed descriptions of these organizational forms, 
in order to obtain categories of similar structures.
However, in this conceptual model we adopt a more 
focused approach to governance structures, with the 
delimitation of the analysis to the choice of the supplier in 
transaction, following Hoetker (2005). In this model we 
consider the choice of governance structure with the type 
of supplier (external or internal). The model considers 
a variable often used in empirical studies of transaction 
cost theory, which is the choice between “make” 
(internal supplier) or “buy” (external supplier). With that 
the construct becomes simpler, which makes easier the 
analysis of the influence of independent variables in future 
empirical studies. 
The second delimitating choice is the focus on transactions 
of manufacturing stage. This choice is justified by the 
ease of description and mapping of manufacturing 
transactions, compared to the stages of research and 
development. Another reason is that the manufacturing 
stage has received great attention from public officials 
and businesses in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector. 
This process can be observed in the case study by 
Nogueira (2011) with the Brazilian laboratory Aché, a 
corporation with more than forty years of operation, 
where the initial growth was based on the company’s 
strategic partnerships with multinational companies 
involving acquisition of industrial plants and licensing of 
drugs from the partners. With this strategy the company 
has accumulated manufacturing expertise and resources 
to increase market share and generate resources for 
innovation activities in new products, which have been 
carried out in more recent years. Another aspect that 
justifies the study of manufacturing is the increasing share 
of generic drugs in Brazil, a segment where excellence in 
the operations stage is critical to the survival of businesses, 
given the difficulty of obtaining price premiums.
The conceptual model was designed to investigate the 
relations between the constructs “governance structure”, 
“transaction costs “, and “competences on operations”. 
The diagram with the representation of these relations 
is shown in Figure 1. Its preparation takes as its starting 
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point the model proposed by Jacobides & Winter (2005). 
These authors argue that the distribution of productive 
capabilities defines the vertical scope with moderation of 
transaction costs. The approach to the present model is 
similar, but considers only the organizational competences 
on operations of the firm that owns the product. This 
choice is justified by the adoption of the product as the unit 
of analysis and by making easier to evaluating the influence 
of the firm´s competences on a specific transaction. The 
model of Jacobides & Winter (2005) is directed to the 
analysis of a population of firms in an industry, where 
the distribution of capabilities could be measured. The 
focus on competence analysis of the company holding the 
product is supported by Bigelow & Argyres (2008), who 
consider the influence of the company’s experience in the 
industry on the choice of governance structure.
!
Figure 1. Logical diagram of the conceptual model to explain the governance structure choice for manufacturing stage
Drawing upon Dosi, Nelson &Winter (2000), Kogut & 
Zander (1992), and Jacobides &Winter (2005) it is expected 
that the limits of the firm be defined by the organizational 
knowledge stored and expressed in processes or 
routines, which is particularly true in the manufacturing 
stage. In this approach, the firm offers an environment for 
exchanging experiences and organizational learning by the 
employees in formal or informal groups, and it establishes 
the conditions for an appropriate level of specialization in 
the different stages of the value chain. It is proposed the 
following hypothesis:
H1 – The competences on operations of the firm that owns 
the product supports the choice of a governance structure 
with internal supplier for the manufacturing stage.
According to Jacobides & Winter (2005), the relationship 
between distribution of competences in a population 
of firms and the vertical scope in a productive chain is 
moderated by transaction costs. In the present model 
it is argued that this situation also could be present in 
the relationship between the competences of the firm 
that owns the product and the governance structure 
adopted by this firm for the manufacturing stage of that 
product. High level of transaction costs could reduces the 
propensity of the firm with a low level of competences 
on operations to choice an external supplier for the 
manufacturing stage. By the other hand, when firm had 
the required competences a low level of transaction costs 
could reduces the tendency for the choice of governance 
structure with an internal supplier for the manufacturing 
stage. The proposed hypothesis for the moderation 
relationship is as follows.
H2 – Transaction costs reduce the significance of the support 
offered by competences on operations by the firm that 
owns the product for the choice of a governance structure 
with internal supplier for the manufacturing stage. 
In the present model, the construct “competences on 
operations” will be measured by the variables “experience” 
and “diversification”. The construct “transaction costs” 
will be measured by the variables “asset specificity” and 
“bargain power”. The diagram of the model with these 
variables and respective hypotheses are presented in the 
Figure 2 and discussed in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 2. Diagram of conceptual model with constructs and respective variables, for explaining the governance structure choice in 
manufacturing stage.
The adoption of variable “experience” follows Henderson 
& Cockburn (1994), who propose the measurement of 
competencies in the pharmaceutical industry. For these 
authors, the relevant competences in order to have success 
in R&D in the pharmaceutical industry are classified into 
two types: component and architectural competences. The 
component competences refer to knowledge about disease 
categories and specific subjects that support the development 
of medicines. The architectural competences are related 
to the ability to combine knowledge from sources outside 
the firm and between disciplines and areas of therapeutic 
classes within the firm. As the focus of the model is the 
manufacturing stage, it is assumed that “experience” may be 
relevant and could be measured by time of the firm in the 
industry and scale of production. This variable is associated 
with the relevant component competences, which in turn 
could influence the choice of governance structure. It is 
proposed the following hypothesis:
H3 – The experience on operations of the firm that owns 
the product supports the choice of a governance structure 
with internal supplier for the manufacturing stage. 
The variable “diversification” reflects the range of 
different types of products delivered by the firm. In the 
pharmaceutical industry the product could be described by 
the pharmaceutical form, therapeutic class and regulatory 
category. It is expected that successful pharmaceutical 
firms should have an efficient minimum size and offer 
a diversified portfolio of products, in order to obtain 
economies of scope in the productive system and the 
management of risks in the R&D for delivering new 
products in the marketplace (Bogner, 1996). A diversified 
portfolio can influence the competences on operations 
by exposing this functional area to a broader range of 
pharmaceutical forms. In this sense, these characteristics 
in capabilities could favor the firm to carrying out in-
house manufacturing. The hypothesis is as follows:
H4 – The diversification in operations of the firm that 
owns the product supports the choice of an internal 
supplier for the manufacturing stage.
The asset specificity is an attribute often discussed in the 
literature of TCE as a factor in the choice of governance 
structure. The basic concept is that the greater investment 
in transaction-specific assets, the greater the tendency 
to adopt the hierarchy to coordinate this transaction, 
in relation to the contracting of external suppliers. The 
basic argument is that the existence of transaction-
specific asset resulting from investments of one partner 
leaves this agent in a disadvantageous position and subject 
to opportunistic behavior by the other partner (Ruester, 
2010). Under these conditions there is a tendency to 
internalize the transaction for the firm. The hypothesis 
is as follows:
H5 – Asset specificity supports the choice by the firm 
that owns the product of a governance structure with 
internal supplier for the manufacturing stage.
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With respect to the variable “bargain power”, it is related 
to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the partner 
in the transaction by the phenomenon of “small numbers”. 
This phenomenon occurs when a potential partner has a 
position of market power for that transaction, because he 
has few competitors, which can lead to hold-up behavior 
to take advantage of this situation of more bargaining 
power. When this is present, the other partner tends 
to avoid the transaction at market conditions, preferring 
vertical integration. This phenomenon was treated by 
Pisano (1991), who analyzed the choice of governance 
structure for R&D activities in biotechnology industry. 
Thus, the proposed hypothesis is as follows:
H6 – The bargain power in relation to other firms 
supports the choice by the firm that owns the product 
of a governance structure with external supplier for the 
manufacturing stage. 
The relationship between “transaction costs” and 
“competences on operations” are less explored in the 
literature and present some difficulties to be depicted 
by researchers because each one is associated to distinct 
objects, respectively the transaction and the firm. 
However, it can be assumed that that the transactions 
carried out by the firm can influence its productive 
capabilities. According to Jacobides &Winter (2005), 
the productive capabilities rest on the firm´s general and 
specific knowledge to do things and also involve specific 
investments in equipment, training and retention of key 
personnel required to put that knowledge to work. 
The assumption of the moderation function of transaction 
costs on the relationship between distribution of 
productive capabilities in a population of firms in an 
industry and the vertical scope is argued by Jacobides 
& Winter (2005) in the short-term model they present. 
These authors offer two hypotheses: (1) if capabilities are 
dissimilar along the value chain, then latent gains from 
trade across firm´s boundaries exist, then a reduction in 
transaction costs will lead to substantial disintegration, 
and (2) if capabilities are similar along the value chain, 
then there are no latent gains from trade across firm 
boundaries, then a reduction in transaction costs will not 
lead to substantial disintegration. 
A critical vision on this approach is presented by Argyres 
& Zenger (2011). They recognize that empirical research in 
the literature corroborate this straightforward application 
of comparative capabilities logic to boundary choices. 
However, they argue that transaction costs and capabilities 
determinants of firm boundaries are intertwined in a 
particularly dynamic way, namely, in forming capabilities 
originally, and in deciding whether to retain, develop or sell 
them off, transaction cost considerations have relevance. 
They focus on how organizations consciously develop their 
capabilities in their early and later boundary decisions, 
and consider that, in addition to simple serendipity, the 
distribution of capabilities across firms and their suppliers 
at any point in time reflects transaction costs operating in 
the past or present. 
In the present model it is argued that transaction costs, 
besides their direct influence on the choice on governance 
structure with internal supplier, could be a driver for the 
development of competences on operations. When the 
organizational learning strategy is feasible, this could be 
done in order to allow the choice of a more coordinated 
governance structure, such as the hierarchy, for the specific 
transaction. In this sense, it is expected that in the short 
term, the higher the transaction costs in transactions carried 
out by the firm, the higher the competences of the firm 
required for that transactions. The hypothesis is as follows. 
H7 – Asset specificity in manufacturing stage support the 
competences on operations of the firm that owns the 
product, which support the choice of a governance structure 
with internal supplier for the manufacturing stage.
The bargain power of a firm in a transaction in the value 
chain of a product depends on at least two factors: (1) the 
dissemination of the technology involved in the transaction, 
(2) the number of suppliers operating with the technology 
in that transaction. The dissemination of the transaction ś 
technology is the frequency or the percentile participation 
of its adoption in the population of products in the industry. 
This level of adoption is associated to the technological 
evolution and emergence of standards in the industry for 
this transaction. The dissemination of the transaction 
favors the number of suppliers and increases bargain 
power of the firm that owns the product, since it reduces 
the risk of opportunistic behavior by potential suppliers. 
In this sense, the adoption of a product with technological 
attributes widely spread in the market reduces the need 
for the development of all the required competences to 
carry out the activity, since an external supplier could be 
contracted under favorable conditions due to the bargain 
power of the firm that owns the product. 
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Given the dissemination level of the technology, it is 
necessary to evaluate the number of suppliers for the 
transaction, or the market factor concentration. The 
more the number of suppliers greater the bargain power 
of the firm that owns the product. If the firm possesses 
this bargain power due to the large number of suppliers, 
this could be a negative incentive for the development 
of competences required for the activities involved in 
the transaction and the subsequent choice of a more 
coordinated governance structure, such as the hierarchy. 
This expected effect on competences could be in support 
of the direct influence of bargain power on the choice 
of a governance structure with an external supplier. The 
hypothesis is as follows.
H8 – Bargain power of the firm that owns the product in 
relation to other firms in the manufacturing stage reduces 
competences on operations. 
The model and hypotheses presented are an effort to 
deepen the comprehension for the role of capabilities and 
transaction costs for the choice of the limits of the firm in 
the manufacturing stage of a product. The variables in the 
model must be deployed in measurable indicators to allow 
data collection and hypotheses testing by multivariate 
analysis. In the next section a brief discussion on possible 
approaches to be followed by researchers in order to test 
the model in the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry. 
Methodological Implications
The study of a strictly regulated industry by federal 
legislation and regulatory agencies such as pharmaceutical 
industry can offers the advantage of data availability in 
public databases. In the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry, 
the federal regulator ANVISA has increased in recent 
years the amount of information publicly available in the 
website of the institution. One of the public databases that 
can help researchers to apply the model presented in this 
study is called Bulário Eletrônico, (Electronic Drug Label 
Database). It is a searchable database hosted in the website 
of ANVISA (<http://portalanvisa.gov.br>) containing drugs 
labels in PDF files to be found by the following fields: 
name of drug, name of pharmaceutical formulae, name 
of the firm that owns the drug, pharmaceutical form, 
presentation and concentration, and regulatory category 
of the drug. 
When a consultant submits a query, the system shows all 
the fields cited above plus the pharmaceutical form, the 
type of drug label with respect the legislation, the date of 
approval of the drug label, and a link for the PDF file of 
the drug label, to be presented in the web browser or to 
be downloaded. In the drug label it is possible to identify 
the pharmaceutical form, the therapeutic class and the 
governance structure of the manufacturing stage, since 
ANVISA must inspect and approve the industrial plants of 
the firm that owns the drug and of the partners in contracts 
for supplying manufacturing services. In this sense, this 
system and each drug label provide the information about 
the limits of the firm in the productive system for each 
product, which can be used as the dependent variable in 
the proposed conceptual model. 
In order to find the indicators for the independent variables 
of the model, the following attributes of a drug could be 
explored: pharmaceutical form, therapeutic class and 
regulatory category. The pharmaceutical form of a drug is 
the physical aspect adopted to deliver the drug. The main 
categories are related to physical states, such as solid 
(pills, capsule, and others), semi-solid, liquid and gases. 
Besides these basic properties, the form may present 
some specific functionality relative to the application of 
the drug in the human body. An exhaustive analysis of 
the database can reveal the existence of at least seventy 
different pharmaceutical forms, which could be grouped 
according basic and specific attributes. 
The therapeutic class is the attribute relative to the 
function of the drug, which can be classified in two levels: 
13 anatomic categories, relative to organs and systems 
of the human body, grouping specific 72 therapeutic 
sub categories, relative to different diseases or effects 
generated by the drug. This method of classification is 
called Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical (ATC), which 
was defined by the World Health Organization (WHO, 
2010) and is suggested as an internationally standard for 
drug classification. The regulatory category of the drug is 
defined by ANVISA and is related to intellectual property 
(new, similar or generic drugs) and technological aspects 
(drugs derived from plants or biotechnological processes). 
Searching and classifying drugs with these criteria could be 
useful for researchers in order to analyze the competences 
of operations of the firm that owns the product, which is 
deployed in experience and diversification, and transaction 
costs in the manufacturing stage of the product, which is 
deployed in asset specificity and bargain power. 
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Data collection could be done in the following steps: (1) 
collection of data on of drugs in the Bulário Eletrònico, 
(2) classification of pharmaceutical form and therapeutic 
class based on standards accepted in the industry (3) to 
search information about the firms that owns the drugs 
on their websites, (4) run the multivariate analysis to test 
the hypotheses. (5) to analyze and discuss the results, 
contrasting with the theory. 
Final Considerations
The paper presented an effort to establish relationships 
between the approaches of transaction costs and 
organizational competences in order to explain the choice 
of governance structures in the manufacturing stage of a 
product. To that end, we developed a conceptual model 
to be applied in an empirical study on the governance 
structures in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector. 
According to the literature, there is a growing number of 
studies with similar goals and applied to various economic 
sectors. The application of the model seems promising in 
the pharmaceutical sector, given the possibility of obtaining 
secondary data of drugs in a public database of ANVISA.
Despite this positive outlook, the study has limitations. The 
first refers to the choice of estimating transaction costs 
only by asset specificity and bargain power. The option 
of neglecting the attributes of frequency and uncertainty 
could be justified by the lack of operational measures in the 
database to be used to test the model in the pharmaceutical 
industry. The case of bargain power adoption is an attempt 
to contribute to deep the comprehension of the influence 
of this aspect on the choice of governance structure, 
which has been neglected in the TCE literature. The 
second limitation is related to the competence approach. 
The use of the experience of companies as a proxy for 
the competences on operations, while simplifying data 
collection, can be questioned in the case of any radical 
innovations in manufacturing, which could cause the loss of 
value of knowledge accumulated by firms.
The contribution of the study may be relevant for providing 
a research model adapted to the pharmaceutical industry, 
which is experiencing profound changes in technology 
and management. In addition, Brazilian companies have 
enormous growth potential, with appropriate support 
from public policy and institutional environment. Besides 
the application as proposed, it can be evaluated in the 
future the fitness of the model for other industries.
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